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LOW-RENT HOUSING AND STATE FINANCING*
E. H. FOLEY, JR.I
Respect for our constitutions, both federal and state, springs from the
conviction that they embody fundamental principles of government and are
not mere codes of civil procedure. Unduly restrictive judicial opinions
necessitating frequent and specific amendments to endow the legislature with
necessary powers of government have a tendency to weaken rather than
strengthen the popular regard for the constitution. The vitality of constitutional principles depends in no small part upon their adaptability to the
pressing problems of modem democracies. And yet in recent years restrictions and limitations in the constitutions of the various states relating
to state and municipal indebtedness have operated in many instances to
obstruct or retard the execution of plans to remedy existing social problems.
Of these problems, by far the most serious is the widespread unemployment
whose threat to the nation's economic well-being directly or indirectly affects
the welfare of every state and municipality in the country. It is not necessary to marshal figures to show how drastic the effects of unemployment
have become during the past few years,1 how private charity has been inadequate to meet the situation,2 how the number of persons receiving relief
from public funds has increased, s and how expenditures by the Federal
4
Government for relief have steadily mounted.
* The present article is based upon a paper read by the author before the Section of

Municipal Law of the American Bar Association at its annual meeting at Boston, August 27,
1936.

t LL. B., 1929, Fordham University; member of the New York Bar; Director, Legal
Division, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works; contributor to legal periodicals.
I. The Federation'sRevised Unemployment Estimate (1936) 43 Aaxaa FEDERATIONIST
64, 65; Trend of Unemploymwent (935) 40 MON. LA. REv. 1329, 1339.
2. 2 MON. Bur. Soc. STATISTICS (U. S. Dep't Labor 1934) No. 4.
3. Report of Federal Emergency Relief Administrator to the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations,SEN. Doc. No. 56, 74 th Cong., 1st Sess. (935).

4. Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on First De-

ficiency AppropriationBill for 1936, pt. 2, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 362.
(239)
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In addition to the unemployment problem, another social problem
which has long been present but which only recently has been recognized as
a serious threat to the well being of the nation is the inadequate housing
facilities for families with low income. Although the effects of inadequate
housing on health, 5 morals, 6 safety 7 and general welfare s have been understood by those who were imbued with a social consciousness, not until the
past few years has the seriousness of the low-rent housing problem been
generally recognized. The roving spotlight which has been directed everywhere to uncover the suffering and distress occasioned by unemployment
has at the same time shown the squalor and the hovels in which too many of
our people have been forced for years to dwell.
There has been no dearth of plans for providing relief for the unemployed and for furnishing decent dwelling accommodations for persons
with low income. Motivated by the desire to alleviate the condition of the
distressed and to correct the abuses of our social and economic order,
students have for years directed their attention to these vexing problems.
But the problems are still present, and the solutions are still visionary.
This paper does not offer any panacea. It is submitted, however, that
the experience of the Federal Government during the past three years in
administering a non-federal public works program and its activity in the
field of low-rent housing have made it possible to see clearly an approach
to these problems which may lead to permanent and beneficial results.
Although unemployment and inadequate housing are not directly attributable
to a common cause, the fact is that these two problems are susceptible of a
single method of attack. It is generally considered that a sound unemployment relief program requires that persons shall be put to work on useful
projects.9 What more useful projects could be selected for the employment
of persons in need of jobs than the construction of dwelling places? A
sound plan for financing a low-rent housing program is also a sound method
5. Britten, The Relation Between Housing and Health (1934) 49 PuB.
(U. S. Pub. Health Service) 1301.

6. CRIME COMM. OF STATE OF NEW YORK, STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1928).

HEALTH REP.
FACTORS IN

7. Lloyd, Moulton and Williams, Housing and Safety in HOUSING AND THE COMMUNITY
(8 President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, 1932) 54-85.
8. WOOD, SLUMS AND BLIGHTED AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES (Fed. Emer. Admin. of
Pub. Works, 1935). Excellent treatment of, and bibliographies on, the low-rent housing problem may be found in BAUER, MODERN HOUSING (1934) ; WOOD, RECENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN HOUSING (1931).
See articles on housing in FORTUNE, Feb. to July, 1932.
9. CLARK, THE ECONOMICS OF PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS (1935); ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (Col. Univ. Comm. 1934) 35-37, 16o-169; GAYER, PUBLIC WORKS IN
PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION (1935); KEYNES, THE MEANS TO PROSPERITY (1933);
SPRAGUE, RECOVERY AND COMMON SENSE (1934) 15-33; Coin and Lehmann, Public Spend-

ing and Recovery in the United States (1936) 3 Soc. RESEARCH 129; Dickinson, Public Con-

struction and Cyclical Unemployment (1928) 139 ANNALS 175; Mund, Prosperity Reserves
of Public Works (193o Supp.) 149 ANNALS I ; Round Table Discussion on Public Works and
Unemployment (1930 Supp.) 2o Am. Ec. Rxv. 15; Slichter, The Economics of Public Works
(I934 Supp.) 24 AM. Ec. REV. 174.
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of relieving unemployment.1 0 If it can be demonstrated that under existing
constitutional limitations and restrictions it is possible for states to finance
the construction of adequate housing facilities for persons with low income,
the way will be clear for combating two of the most serious problems confronting states and municipalities today.
The principles which underlie the financing of low-rent housing by
states and the legal difficulties which must be overcome before such a program can be successfully undertaken are not substantially different from
the principles and legal difficulties involved in carrying out any state program
of public works. The constitutional barriers which would prevent a state
from undertaking a program of public works calculated to furnish its citizens with water, sewerage, electric, educational or hospital facilities would
operate to prevent that state from undertaking a program of low-rent housing as well. Likewise, methods which states have successfully employed
in financing useful public improvements notwithstanding constitutional
limitations and restrictions should also be available for financing a low-rent
housing program. It would, therefore, be appropriate to discuss some of
the methods which have been attempted by states to finance the construction
of various types of public improvements and to make some suggestions for
adapting the legal principles involved in these methods to a state-wide lowrent housing program.
OBLIGATIONS PAYABLE FROM AN EXCISE TAX

There are several methods which have been successfully employed by
states to finance the construction of public improvements despite constitutional provisions which, before judicial clarification, would seem to have
precluded the particular type of financing employed. One method is by the
issuance of obligations payable from a special fund derived from the proceeds of excise taxes levied on the privilege of engaging in certain activities
or on the use of certain facilities. This method of state financing was discussed in a recent New Mexico case 11 in which provisions of the New
Mexico constitution relating to the amount and manner of incurring a state
debt similar to provisions found in most other state constitutions were construed in relation to obligations payable from a special excise tax. Under
a 1934 law,' 2 the New Mexico Capitol Addition Commission was authorized
to borrow $175,000 with which to construct and equip a supreme court
building as an addition to the state capitol. 13 This sum was to be raised
IO. See Topkis, Material and Labor Costs Involved in the Construction of a Large
Apartment Building (1935) 41 MoN. LAB. REv. 541. See also Byer, Employment Created by
P. W. A. Construction (1936) 41 MoN. LAB. REv. 838.
ii.State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm. v. Connelly, 39 N. M. 312, 46 P. (2d)
1097 (935).

12. N. M. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 14.
13. Id. §§ 1-2.
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through the sale of debentures which were to be payable from the funds received from the collection of a fee of $2.50 levied upon every civil action
14
filed in the office of the clerks of the various district courts of the state.
The Act provided that the debentures would constitute an irrevocable contract between the State of New Mexico and the holders of the debentures,
that the taxes or fees pledged for the payment of the debentures would not
be reduced so long as any of the debentures would remain outstanding and
unpaid, and that the state would cause the taxes and fees to be collected
promptly and set aside and applied to the payment of the debentures and
the interest thereon according to their terms. 15 The New Mexico constitution authorizes the state to borrow money in a limited amount to meet
casual deficits or for necessary expenses and also authorizes the state to
contract debts to suppress insurrection and to provide for the public defense. 6 But aside from this it prohibits the incurring of any state debt
unless authorized by law for some specified work or object, which law must
provide for an annual tax levy sufficient to pay the interest and to provide
a sinking fund to pay the principal of the debt within fifty years; and no
such law can take effect until it has been approved by a majority of all the
7
votes cast at a general election.'
In answer to a mandamus action brought to compel the state treasurer
to countersign the debentures as required by the statute,'5 it was contended
that the debt proposed to be created by the issuance of the debentures was
prohibited by the constitution, inasmuch as the debentures constituted a
general obligation on the part of the state and, before being issued, required
approval by a majority vote of the qualified electors, as well as compliance
with all the other constitutional provisions incident to the creation of a
state debt. The Supreme Court of New Mexico had previously upheld the
issuance of obligations payable from a special fund derived from the revenues to be furnished by the project for which the bonds were issued as not
being a debt within the meaning of the constitutional limitation on municipal
indebtedness.' 9 This court had also held that obligations of the University
of New Mexico payable from a special fund consisting of the income from
lands belonging to the University did not constitute a state debt. 20

The state treasurer argued that these earlier cases were not controlling
on the question at issue because the debentures proposed to be issued by the
Capitol Addition Building Commission would not be payable from a special
fund of the type considered in the earlier decisions. The court, however,
14. Id. §§ 4-5.
15. Id. § 12.
16. N. M. CorsT. art. IX, § 7.

17. Id. §8.

18. N. M. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 14, § 6.

ig. Seward v. Bowers, 37 N. M. 385, 24 P. (2d) 253 (1933).
State v. Regents of Univ. of N. M., 32 N. M. 428, 258 Pac. 57i (927).

20.
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construed the word "debt" as used in the New Mexico constitution as comprehending an obligation which was payable from an ad valorem tax but
not one payable from a tax in the nature of an excise tax. 21 The basis for
this construction was found in the history of the constitutional provision,
which, the court stated, showed that the framers were writing and thinking
of an obligation payable from the proceeds of a property tax levied against
the general assessment rolls, and that the debt the creation of which was prohibited by the constitution or the amount of which was limited thereby was
one pledging the general faith and credit of the state with a consequent
recourse in the holders to the general taxing power. The court concluded
that the debentures in question, since they did not require a resort to the
general taxing power of the state for their retirement but were payable
from the proceeds of an imposition in the nature of an excise, did not constitute a general obligation on the part of the state and hence were not within
22
the ban of the constitution.
The construction of the word "debt" as embracing only obligations
payable from property taxes, is not a construction adopted solely by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, for in other jurisdictions a similar interpretation of a state constitutional debt limitation has been adopted. Thus,
in Colorado 23 and in Kansas, 24 revenue anticipation warrants issued for
the construction and maintenance of highways, such warrants to be paid
with the proceeds of excise taxes derived from the imposition of licenses
and registration fees and from the imposition of an excise tax on gasoline,
have been held not to be debts of the respective states. Similarly, in
Oregon 25 and in Washington-26 the word "debt", as used in a constitutional provision limiting state indebtedness, was held not to apply to obligations payable only from a fund made up of liquor license fees, penalties,
forfeitures, and income and revenues received under a state liquor control
act.
And in South Carolina an agreement by the state to reimburse a county
for moneys spent in the construction of roads, from a special fund consisting
of the state gasoline tax, the state automobile tax and sums received as
federal aid, was held not to create a debt of the state. 27 The South Carolina
court stated the proposition as follows:
21. State ex rel Capitol Addition Bldg. Comnm. v. Connelly, 39 N. M. 32, 46 P. (2d)
1097 (1935).

Id. at 322, 46 P. (2d) at 1103.
Johnson v. McDonald, 97 Colo. 324, 49 P. (2d) 1017 (935) ; cf. In re Senate Resolution No. 2 Concerning Constitutionality of House Bill No. 6, 94 Colo. 1oi, 31 P. (2d) 325
(933) ; State ex rel. Porterie v. Charity Hospital, 182 La. 268, i6r So. 6o6 (1935).
22.
23.

24. State ex rel. Boynton v. State Highway Comm., 138 Kan. 913, 28 P. (2d) 770
; State ex rel. Boynton v. Kansas State Highway Comm., 139 Kan. 391, 32 P. (2d)

(934)

493 ('934).
25. Moses v. Meier, 148 Ore. i85, 35 P. (2d) 981 (934).
26. Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465, 32 P. (2d) 56o Q934).
27. Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S. C. 288, 135 S. E. 153 (1926).
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"Is such a limited liability a debt of the state in the constitutional
sense? The underlying purpose of the constitutional provisions concerning the creation of state debt was that they should serve as a limit
of taxation-as a protection to taxpayers, and especially those whose
property might be subjected to taxation. This purpose will not be
defeated if it should be held by this court that a debt for the construction of a state highway system, payable exclusively from federal aid
moneys and special license taxes to be borne by the persons who will
derive the principal benefits from the state highway system, is not a
debt of the kind required by the constitution to be approved by the
voters of the state before it is incurred." 28
The principle thus enunciated by the South Carolina court in 1926 has
been carried even further in that state by a line of cases involving the issuance of obligations backed by the full faith, credit and taxing power of the
state but payable in the first instance from a special excise tax. The most
recent affirmance of this principle was in connection with the issuance of
obligations by the state for the purpose of financing buildings at various state
eleemosynary institutions. These obligations were to be payable in the first
instance either from the gross revenues of the institution at which the
project to be constructed was located, or from the gross receipts of any.
excise, license or privilege tax levied by the state on persons, firms and corporations engaged in the business of manufacturing, generating or selling
electric power. Regardless of the source of payment of the bonds in the
first instance, they were to constitute general obligations and the full faith,
credit and taxing power of the state were pledged to their payment. The
Act 29 authorizing the issuance of the bonds provided that before such bonds
could be issued, the governor and state treasurer should determine in writing
that the specific revenues or taxes from which they were to be payable in the
first instance would be sufficient to pay the principal of and interest on the
bonds without resorting to other taxes or revenues of the state.30 Following
its earlier decisions, 31 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that
obligations secured in the first instance by a pledge of a fund which might
reasonably be expected to be sufficient to meet the obligations without resorting to the levy of a property tax do not constitute a bonded debt within
the meaning of the constitutional limitation, notwithstanding that the full
faith, credit and taxing power of the state are also pledged to their pay32

ment.

28. Id. at 301, 135 S. E. at 157.
29. S. C. Acts 1934, p. 2269.
30. Id. § 2.

31. Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S. C. 288, 135 S. E. 153 (1926) ; State ex rel. Rich(1929) ; State ex rel. Crawford v. Stevens, 173
S. C. 149, 175 S. E. 213 (934).

ards v. Moorer, 152 S. C. 455, 150 S. E. 269

32. Crawford v. Johnston, 177 S. C. 399, 181 S. E. 476 (1935). In an earlier case the
court had held that a guaranty by a city of obligations payable from special assessments upon
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The attitude expressed by the New Mexico court in the Capitol Addition case and by other courts which have held that obligations payable from
a special fund made up of receipts from an excise tax are not state debts is
by no means universally accepted. 33 The argument that no state debt is
created unless a property tax is pledged to its payment was severely criticized
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals which said:
"Under this contention, the legislature, or the debt contracting authority, could divide the public revenue into numerous subdivisions,
calling one the 'road fund,' another the 'school fund,' another the
'agricultural fund,' another the 'public health fund,' and others almost
without limit. Debts could then be contracted in unlimited amounts
and payable in the far distant future, and still be immune from attack
as violating constitutional provisions limiting indebtedness, provided
each debt was made payable out of some one of the specially designated
funds into which all of the revenue collected by taxation from the
people had been divided. A mere statement of the proposition carries
with it, it seems to us, its own refutation." 34
Some of the decisions holding that bonds payable from an excise tax
do not constitute a state debt possibly can be justified on the ground that
the bonds are payable from a tax levied only upon the class specially benefited
by the use to which the proceeds of the bonds are devoted, but the courts
which have upheld such obligations have not based their decisions upon any
such relationship between the project constructed and the particular class
upon which the tax is levied. The tenuous reasoning advanced by the courts
as a basis for holding that obligations payable from a special excise tax do
not contravene a constitutional debt limitation, coupled with the criticism
of the cases which attempt to differentiate one type of taxation from
another as a basis for determining what obligations create a debt within
the meaning of a constitutional limitation, makes it advisable to look to
other plans of state financing for a satisfactory method of undertaking a
state program of public works, including low-rent housing.
OBLIGATIONS PAYABLE FROM THE INCOME OR PROCEEDS OF A LAND GRANT

A sounder method, which some states have employed to finance the
construction of necessary improvements, but one which can have only a
property specially benefited would not create a city debt because the liability of the city was
,contingent. Lillard v. Melton, 103 S. C. IO, 87 S. E. 421 (1915).
See Sullivan v. City
Council of Charleston, 123 S. C. gi, iz6 S. E. 1O4 (1923) ; Simons v. City Council of Charleston, 187 S. E. 545 (S. C. 1936).
33. In re Opinions of the Justices, 225 Ala. 356, 143 So. 289 (1932) ; In re Opinions of
-the Justices, 225 Ala. 361, 143 So. 808 (1932) ; State ex rel. Fletcher v. Executive Council of
Iowa, 207 Iowa 923, 223 N. W. 727 (1929) ; Crick v. Rash, i9o Ky. 820, 229 S. W. 63 (1921) ;
State ex rel. Diederichs v. State Highway Comm., 89 Mont. 2o5, 296 Pac. 1033 (931).
See
In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 94 Fla. 967, 114 So. 85o (1927) ; Martin v. Dade Muck
Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 116 So. 449 (1928) ; Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. I, 65, 115, 126 So. 308,
.331, 347 (1930).
34. Crick v. Rash, 190 Ky. 820, 836, 229 S. W. 63, 70 (1921).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

restricted application, is the issuance of obligations payable solely from the
income or proceeds of a land grant. The rationale of the land grant cases
is that moneys received by the states as income or proceeds from lands
granted to the states by the Federal Government for specific purposes constitute a trust fund for such purposes. Obligations payable from such a
trust fund are held not to constitute debts of the state because the state in
issuing such obligations is acting merely as an agency to execute a trust.3 5
What makes the land grant cases significant is that they were among
the first to recognize the distinction between the general funds of the state
and funds held by the state in trust for certain designated purposes. Even
before the question had been raised as to whether bonds issued against the
land grant funds were state debts, other constitutional questions had to be
cleared away. These questions arose because of state constitutional provisions requiring that state money must be appropriated before it can be
paid out of the state treasury 36 and that certain state officers should have
exclusive jurisdiction over state funds.37
Thus, in an early Montana case, it was held that funds derived from
various land grants and trust funds were not subject to the requirement of
appropriation by the legislature,3" and in Idaho it was held that the state
treasurer had no authority to place money into the state treasury when such
35. State ex tel. Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ. of Mont., 56 P. (2d) 1O79 (1936) ; State
v. Regents of Univ. of N. M., 32 N. M. 428, 258 Pac. 571 (1927) ; Allen v. Grimes, 9 Wash.
424, 37 Pac. 662 (1894) ; State ex rel. State Capitol Comm. v. Clausen, 134 Wash. 196, 235
Pac. 364 (1925); Arnold v. Bond, 47 Wyo. 236, 34 P. (2d) 28 (1934) ; cf. State ex rel.
Haire v. Rice, 33 Mont. 365, 83 Pac. 874 (19o6), aff'd, 204 U. S. 291 (1907). A debt is created, however, if the interest on the obligations is payable from taxes [State ex tel. State
Capitol Comm. v. Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 156 Pac. 858 (1916) ], or if the state guarantees the repayment of the obligations [State Capitol Comm. v. State Bd. of Finance, 74 Wash. 15, 132
Pac. 861 (1913) ].

In several jurisdictions attempts to issue obligations payable from the proceeds or income
from federal land grants have been held unconstitutional. Roach v. Gooding, ii Idaho 244,
81 Pac. 642 (19o5); State ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands v. McMillan, 12 N. D. 280,
96 N. W. 310 (19o3); State ex tel. Univ. of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 4o6, 1o4 Pac. 285
(19o9), 24 L. R. A. (x. s.) 126o (igio). These cases are analyzed in the opinion of Blume,
J., in Arnold v. Bond, supra.
36. E. g., N. M. CONST. art. IV, § 30: "Except interest or other payments on the public
debt, money shall be paid out of the treasury only upon appropriations made by the legislature. No money shall be paid therefrom except upon warrant drawn by the proper officer.
Every law making an appropriation shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object
to which it is to be applied."
37. E. g., MONT. CoNsT. art. VII, § 20: "The governor, secretary of state and attorney
general . . . shall constitute a board of examiners, with power to examine all claims
against the state, except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law...
"
For a discussion of constitutional restrictions upon state indebtedness see Secrist, An

Economic Analysis of the ConstitutionalRestrictions Upon Public Indebtedness in the United
States (1914) No. 637 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 1-53.
38. State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, 17 Mont. 529, 43 Pac. 928 (1896). Accord: Evans v.
Van Deusen, 31 Idaho 614, 174 Pac. 122 (1918) ; State ex rel. Black v. State Bd. of Educ.,
33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 (1921) ; State ex tel. Dildine v. Collins, 21 Mont. 448, 53 Pac.
1114 (1898).
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money was given by the Federal Government for the benefit of certain agricultural and mechanical colleges.8"
Having laid down the principle that land grant funds were not subject
to constitutional provisions governing appropriations of or state officers'
control over state moneys, the courts had little difficulty in extending this
principle to special funds made up of other than land grant proceeds, such
as a fund made up of a special state motor vehicle or motor fuel tax, 40
rents and income of a state sanatorium,4 ' revenues of a state normal
43
school, 42 moneys contributed by public bodies pursuant to a bonding statute,
sums collected by a state guarantee fund commission, 44 proceeds collected
pursuant to a workmen's compensation act, 45 moneys in a state hail insur47
ance fund,4 6 and moneys collected pursuant to a state liquor control act.
It would thus appear that the courts would hold that moneys which a
state derived from the operation of a revenue-producing enterprise such as
a low-rent housing project and which are kept separate from other state
moneys are not subject to constitutional provisions relating to appropriations out of the state treasury or to constitutional provisions relating to the
control over state moneys by a particular officer or body.4" In order to
support the proposition that obligations payable from such moneys would
not constitute a debt of the state, it is not necessary to rely on the cases
holding that obligations are not a state debt when made payable from a fund
consisting of excise tax proceeds or sources other than the income of a
revenue-producing enterprise. That such obligations do not constitute a
debt of the state follows from the special fund doctrine. This is the doctrine that obligations payable from a special fund made up from the revenues
of an enterprise for the construction or improvement of which such bonds
are issued do not constitute debts within the meaning of a constitutional
provision restricting or limiting state or municipal indebtedness. 49
39. Melgard v. Eagleson, 31 Idaho 411, 172 Pac. 655 (1918). Accord: Black v. State
Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 2O (1921) ; State ex tel Bickford v. Cook, 17 Mont.
529, 43 Pac. 928 (1896) ; State ex rel Arming-ton v. Wright, I7 Mont. 565, 44 Pac. 89 (1896) ;
State ex -el. Koch v. Barrett, 26 Mont. 62, 66 Pac. 504 (1901) ; Barbour v. State Bd. of
Educ., 92 Mont. 321, 13 P. (2d) 225 (1932).
40. State ex -el. Boynton v. Kansas State Highway Comm., 139 KIan. 391, 32 P. (2d)
493 (1934).
41. State ex teL Hawkins v. State Bd. of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P. (2d) 116
(1934).

42. State ex tel. Blume v. State Bd. of Educ., 97 Mont. 371, 34 P. (2d) 515 (1934).
43. State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561 (19x6).
44. Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N. D. 603, 200 N. W. 524 (1924).

45. State cx tel. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N. D. 61g, 175 N. W. 714 (1919).
46. State ex tel. Olson v. Jorgenson, 29 N. D. 173, 15o N. W. 565 (1915).
47. Moses v. Meier, 148 Ore. i85, 35 P. (2d) 981 (934) ; Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash.
465, 32 P. (2d) 56o (1934).

48. Cf. State Water Conservation Bd. v. Enking, 58 P. (2d) 779 (Idaho, 1936).
49. Foley, Some Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Municipal Financing of
Public Works (1935) 4 FORmHAm L. REV. 13.
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THE SPECIAL FUND DOCTRINE

It is important to bear in mind that not every obligation payable from
a special fund involves the application of the so-called special fund doctrine.
For example, when obligations issued by a state educational institution to
finance the construction of a project are made payable from the revenues
of the institution derived from matriculation and laboratory fees as well
as from fees imposed in connection with the project, courts have held that
such obligations do not create debts of the state because they are payable
from a special fund. 50 Although it is perhaps natural for courts in reaching a new result or extending an existing principle to use the phrases mentioned in the precedents relied upon, confusion has undoubtedly resulted
from the use of the terms "special fund" and "special fund doctrine" with
reference to any obligations payable from a special fund regardless of the
sources of the moneys paid into the special fund. The generally accepted
special fund doctrine, here applied in connection with state indebtedness,
covers only those cases in which obligations issued for a project are made
payable from the fees imposed in connection with the project and from no
other source. 5' Obligations payable from an excise tax 52 or from any
other special source of state revenue " would be payable from a special
fund, but they would not be the type of obligation which comes within the
compass of the special fund doctrine. The decisions of the courts dealing
with obligations payable from a special fund range from those which hold
that state obligations payable only from the proceeds of certain land grants
are not state debts '4 to the extreme case in which state obligations are held
not to be a debt within the meaning of a state constitution because they were
50. Cases applying this principle: Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Alabama State Bridge
Corp., 59 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Alabama State Bridge Corp. v. Smith, 217 Ala.
311, 116 So. 695 (1928) ; In re Opinions of the Justices, 225 Ala. 460, 143 So. 900 (1932) ;
State v. Regents of Univ. System, 179 Ga. 21o, 175 S. E. 567 (1934) ; State ex rel. Veeder v.

State Bd. of Educ., 97 Mont. 121, 33 P. (2d) 516 (1934) ; State ex iel. Blume v. State Bd. of

Educ., 97 Mont. 371, 34 F. (2d) 515 (934)

; Crawford v. Johnston, 177 S. C. 399, 181 S. E.

476 (1935) semble; cf. State Highway Comm. v. King, 259 Ky. 414, 82 S. W. (2d) 443
(1935); State ex rel. Porterie v. Charity Hospital, 182 La. 268, 161 So. 6o6 (1935).
51. Cases applying this principle: lit re Canal Certificates, 1g Colo. 63, 34 Pac. 274
(1893); Hopkins v. Baldwin, 167 So. 677 (Fla. 1936) ; Brash v. State Tuberculosis Bd., 16q
So. 218 (Fla. 1936) ; Bloxton v. State Highway Comm., 225 Ky. 324, 8 S. W. (2d) 392
(1928) ; State Highway Comm. v. Veling, 230 Ky. 381, 19 S. W. (2d) 967 (1929) ; Estes v.
State Highway Comm., 235 Ky. 86, 29 S. W. (2d) 583 (1930) ; Hughes v. State Bd. of
Health, 260 Ky. 228, 84 S. W. (2d) 52 (935) ; Van Hooser & Co. v. University of Ky., 262
Ky. 581, 9o S. W. (2d) 1029 (1936) ; Barbour v. State Bd. of Educ., 92 Mont. 321, 13 P.
(2d) 225 (1932) ; State ex rel. Hawkins v. State Bd. of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P. (2d)
116 (1934); State ex tel. Kaufman v. Davis, 59 N. D. 191, 229 N. W. 105 (930); Kasch v.
Miller, 104 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 813 (1922) ; Baker v. Carter, 165 Okla. 116, 25 P. (2d)
747 (933) ; McClain v. Regents of the University, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1928) ; Bates
v. State Bridge Comm., lO9 W. Va. 186, 153 S. E. 305 (1930). Contra: State Water Con-

servation Bd. v. Enking, 53 P. (2d) 779 (Idaho, 1936) ; Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps, 7
N. Y. 9 (1852); Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 63 (N. Y. 1852).
52. See cases cited supra notes II, 23-27.

53. E. g., income from land grants.
54. See cases cited supra note 35.
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payable from a fund built up from a special ad valorem property tax. 55
It is only when the acquisition or improvement of a revenue-producing
enterprise is financed by the issuance of obligations payable solely from the
revenues of such enterprise that the principles of the special fund doctrine
are applicable. It is submitted that the consideration of these problems
would be clarified if the use of the term "special fund doctrine" would be
confined only to cases where the obligations under consideration are payable from the income of a revenue-producing undertaking and if obligations payable from sources other than such income would be identified by
the particular source from which the obligations are payable. Examples
of obligations in this latter category would be those payable from an excise
tax, or those payable from the proceeds or income of a land grant, and these
should not be referred to as obligations involving the special fund doctrine.
Several cases decided by the Supreme Court of Florida 56 during the
past few months have shown a novel application of the principles underlying
the special fund doctrine. In enunciating a rationale applicable to revenue
financing, the Florida court not only outlined a method of state financing
of public improvements, but drew an interesting distinction between such
financing by the state and by municipal corporations of the state.
The Florida decisions relating to state revenue financing appear to be
inconsistent with those relating to revenue financing by cities. The basis
for the court's holding that the proposed revenue obligations of the state
were not bonds was that the issuance of these obligations would not directly
or indirectly impose an added burden on the taxing power of the state or
have the effect of impairing the credit of the state. The basis for the court's
holding that the proposed revenue obligations of municipal corporations
were bonds was that the issuance of these obligations would indirectly
create a burden on the taxing power. If the construction of a project will
result in a coercive moral or legal necessity for levying a tax in the event
the revenues of the project should be insufficient to operate it, then, under
the Florida decisions, any obligations, whether payable from revenues or
55. Brown v. Ringdahl, iog Minn. 6, 122 N. W. 469 (1go9). In an earlier case, the Minnesota court had held that the levy of a tax for a period of nine years to provide funds with
which to construct the state capitol did not create a debt of the state.

Fleckten v. Lamberton,

69 Minn. 187, 72 N. W. 65 (1897). The court in the Brown case held it immaterial that the
earlier act was for the use of taxes levied for a particular purpose and the later act authorized the borrowing of money and the issuance of evidences of indebtedness anticipating the
collection of a tax for a particular purpose.
56. State ex rel. Diver v. Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1936) ; State v. Lake City, 116
Fla. IO, 156 So. 924 (1934) ; State v. Daytona Beach, 118 Fla. 29, 158 So. 300 (1934) ; Boykin v. River Junction, 121 Fla. 902, 164 So. 558 (1935) ; Board of County Comm'rs v. Her-

rick, 167 So. 386 (Fla. 1936) ; Hopkins v. Baldwin, 167 So. 677 (Fla. 1936) ; Brash v. State
Tuberculosis Bd., 167 So. 827 (Fla. 1936); Brash v. State Tuberculosis Bd., 169 So. 218
(Fla. 1936) ; Hygema v. City of Sebring, 169 So. 366 (Fla. 1936). For a complete discussion
of the cases, see Foley, Revenue Financinq of Public Enterprises (1936) 35 MicH. L. REV.
I, 23-26.
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taxes, issued to finance the original construction of the project are bonds
within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The court's view is that the embarkation upon a new municipal venture
might lead to the necessity at some future time for levying a tax in order to
continue the services of the new venture, and the court would not interfere
with a levy of a tax for such purpose. But in the case of a state project, if
an attempt should be made to levy a tax for the purpose of operating a
project, originally financed by the issuance of revenue obligations, the court
intimates that it would render appropriate injunctive relief. Thus the
Florida court applies the special fund doctrine to revenue financing by the
state or agencies of the state differently from the way it is applied to
municipal revenue financing. The fact that the constitutional provision
relating to state bonds is an absolute prohibition, whereas the provision
relating to municipal bonds is only a restriction which can be complied with
by holding an election, undoubtedly is a factor in explaining this difference
in the attitude of the Florida court towards state and municipal revenue
financing.
The distinction made by the Florida court in construing powers granted
to the state under the constitution and powers granted to municipalities is
significant not only in connection with a state program of low-rent housing
but with any state public works program. During the past few years there
has been a tendency of the courts to uphold the exercise of extensive implied
powers by a state agency where such powers would be denied to municipal
corporations.5 7 Such a distinction is important in view of the fact that the
ultimate responsibility for alleviating the distress occasioned by a widespread social evil rests not alone with the governmental unit where the
problem is most acute but rather with the state itself, which is better able
57. Courts have been liberal in construing the powers of incorporated state agencies. The
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin was empowered "to accomplish the objects
and perform the duties prescribed by law." Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) c. 25, § 379. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, after noting the similarity of the quoted words to the last clause
of Art. I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, said: "By parity of reasoning it may be said
that it is for the board of regents to choose the means which in their judgment is necessary
or convenient, provided only they are calculated to accomplish the objects sought by the charter and within the scope of the general powers granted, and not in conflict with the statute."
State ex rel. Priest v. Regents of University of Wis., 54 Wis. 159, 170, II N. W. 472, 477
(1882).
This attitude toward the powers of incorporated state institutions has found strong
support in Georgia and in Minnesota. State v. Regents of University System, 179 Ga. 210,
175 S. E. 567 (1934); Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N. W. 217
(1931).
Several recent cases emphasize the distinction in the manner of construing powers
granted a state and those granted a municipality. In Kentucky, the State Highway Commission was held to have the implied power to issue revenue refunding bonds. State Highway
Comm. v. King, 215 Ky. 414, 82 S. W. (2d) 443 (1935). In Washington, the Department
of Conservation and Development was held to have the implied power to issue bonds from
the power to borrow money. State ex rel. Banker v. Yelle, 183 Wash. 380, 48 P. (2d) 573
(935).
And in Montana, the State Board of Education was held to have the implied power
to borrow money as well as to issue its negotiable bonds from the power to construct a
project. State ex rel. Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 56 P. (2d) 1079 (Mont. 1936). Accord:
Guillot v. State Highway Comm., 56 P. (2d) IO72 (Mont. x936).
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to cope with forces whose effects are not confined to particular localities.
There is considerable judicial precedent sustaining the proposition that constitutional restrictions and limitations on the debt-incurring powers of the
states do not preclude the undertaking and financing by states of revenueproducing enterprises on a self-liquidating basis.
Thus, toll bridges by Kentucky 5s and West Virginia; 59 dormitories
62 and
for educational institutions by Oklahoma,6 0 Oregon, 61 Montana,
North Dakota; 63 sanatoria by Kentucky 64 and Montana; 15 water conservation projects by Montana 66 and Ohio; 67 and canals by Colorado 68 all have
been successfully financed by the states through the issuance of revenue
obligations.
Low-RENT HOUSING: A STATE PURPOSE

The methods which states have successfully employed in financing
various types of revenue-producing enterprises should serve as a basis for
a plan of financing low-rent housing. In addition to the question of the
constitutional limit on state indebtedness, however, there arises in connection with any state program of low-rent housing the question as to whether
such an undertaking would be a proper public purpose. Recently this question was passed upon by the New York Court of Appeals in an action to
dismiss condemnation proceedings started by the New York City Housing
Authority for the purpose of acquiring lands for a low-rent housing
project. 69

Although there were judicial precedents upholding the use of

public moneys for carrying on a program of housing for persons of low-'
income 7 0 the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such housing
purposes had never before been passed upon by the courts in any state.
58. Bloxton v. State Highway Comm., 225 Ky. 324, 8 S. W. (2d) 392 (1928) ; State
Highway Comm. v. Veling, 23o Ky. 381, I9 S. W. (2d) 967 (1929) ; Estes v. State Highway
Comm., 235 Ky. 86, 29 S. W. (2d) 583 (930).
59. Bates v. State Bridge Comm., IO9 W. Va. I86, 153 S. E. 305 (1930).
6o. Baker v. Carter, 165 Okla. 116, 25 P. (2d) 747 (933).

6I. McClain v. Regents of the University, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1928).
62. Barbour v. State Bd. of Educ., 92 Mont. 321, 13 P. (2d) 225 (1932).
63. State ex rel. Kaufman v. Davis, 59 N. D. 191, 229 N. W. 105 (1930).
64. Hughes v. State Bd. of Health, 26o

Ky. 228, 84 S. W. (2d) 52 (I935).

65. State ex rel. Hawkins v. State Bd. of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P. (2d) 116
(934).
66. State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, IOO Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (1935). Coltra:
State Water Conservation Bd. v. Enking, 58 P. (2d) 779 (Idaho, 1936).
67. Kasch v. Miller, 1O4 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 813 (1922).
68. It re Canal Certificates, ig Colo. 63, 34 Pac. 274 (1893). Contra: Newell v. People
ex rel. Phelps, 7 N. Y. 9 (1852) ; Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 63 (N. Y. 1852).
69. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 27o N. Y. 333, I N. E. (2d) 153,
84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 902, 5 BROOxLYN L. REV. 327, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 813, 31 ILL. L.
REv. X13, 45 YALE L. J. 1519 (1936). See also Note (1936) 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 280, 287.
70. Green v. Frazier, 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11 (1920), aff'd, 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
Accord: Willmon v. Powell, 91 Cal. App. I, 266 Pac. 1029 (1928) ; Libby v. Portland, 105
Me. 370, 74 Atl. 805 (19o9) ; Simon v. O'Toole, io8 N. J. L. 32, 155 Atl. 449 (93) ; cf.
Hoskins v. Orlando, 51 F. (2d) 9O1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). But cf. It re Opinion of Justices,
211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611 (1912) ; In re Opinion of Justices, 195 N. E. 897 (Mass. 1935).
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After citing earlier New York cases upholding the power of eminent domain
for drainage purposes as affording an analogy to condemnation for housing
purposes, the New York Court of Appeals held that the project for which
the New York City Housing Authority was seeking to condemn lands constituted a public use for which the legislature might confer the power of
eminent domain. The basis for the court's decision was concisely stated
by Judge Crouch as follows:
"The fundamental purpose of government is to protect the health,
safety, and general welfare of the public. All its complicated activities
have that simple end in view. Its power plant for the purpose consists
of the power of taxation, the police power, and the power of eminent
domain. Whenever there arises, in the state, a condition of affairs
holding a substantial menace to the public health, safety, or general
welfare, it becomes the duty of the government to apply whatever
power is necessary and appropriate to check it. There are differences
in the nature and characteristics of the powers, though distinction between them is often fine. [Citations omitted.] But if the menace is
serious enough to the public to warrant public action and the power
applied is reasonably and fairly calculated to check it, and bears a reasonable relation to the evil, it seems to be constitutionally immaterial
whether one or another of the sovereign powers is employed." 7The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1912 had held unconstitutional a statute to provide homes "for mechanics, laborers or other
wage earners" on the ground, among others, that providing housing for
such a limited group of persons would be for a private purpose. 72 This
same point of view was urged in the New York case, but the court very
emphatically disposed of it by saying:
"This objection disregards the primary purpose of the legislation.
Use of a proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody and anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use. The
designated class to whom incidental benefits will come are persons with
an income under $2,500 a year, and it consists of two-thirds of the
city's population. But the essential purpose of the legislation is not to
benefit that class or any class; it is to protect and safeguard the entire
public from the menace of the slums."

73

Once it is established that housing for persons of low income is a
purpose for which public funds may properly be expended, there remains
only to determine how such projects may best be financed if we are to see
any substantial advances made in solving the problem.
71. 270

N. Y.

at 340, I N. E. (2d) at i55.
211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611 (1912).
73. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 27o N. Y. 333, 342, i N. E. (2d) 153,
72.
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In re Opinion of Justices,

(1936).
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LOW-RENT HOUSING:

A

METHOD OF FINANCING

It has already been pointed out that a state-wide program of low-rent
housing projects could lawfully be financed on a self-liquidating basis by
the issuance of revenue bonds payable solely from the revenues of the
projects. The method employed by the New York legislature has not been
direct state action but the creation of housing authorities which are corporate entities, separate and distinct from the state itself and from the
municipal corporations of the state, with broad powers to undertake and
finance slum clearance and low-rent housing projects. 74 These authorities
have no taxing power but must depend for their revenues entirely upon the
income-producing ability of the projects which they undertake. The authority concept in the field of public revenue financing represents the most
promising development in the law relating to the financing of useful public
improvements. In the past few years the use of the authority as an instrument for undertaking and financing public improvements has been successful
for many types of enterprises. The utilization of such a separate corporate
instrumentality has been sustained by courts in Texas to finance a state
program of electrification and water conservation; 75 in Montana, for the
conservation of the water resources of the state; 76 in South Carolina, for
the development of a state hydro-electric nagivation and flood control program; 77 in Nebraska, for public power and irrigation; 78 in New York,
for sewer 71 and power 80 projects; in California, for a toll bridge; 81 and
in Arizona,8 2 Georgia,8 3 Idaho, 4 Louisiana, 85 and Minnesota "- for the
construction of buildings by state educational institutions.8 7
The use of the housing authority as an instrumentality for financing,
constructing and operating adequate housing facilities for persons with low
income as well as for providing employment in the construction of such
housing projects is a practical as well as a lawful method of attacking the
unemployment and the inadequate housing problems. Judged by any stand74. N. Y. Laws

1934, c. 4.
75. Lower Colo. River Authority v. McCraw, 125 Tex. 268, 83 S. W. (2d) 629 (1935).
76. State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, Ioo Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (1935).
Contra:

State Water Conservation Bd. v. Enking, 58 P. (2d) 779 (Idaho, 1936).
77. Clarke v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481 (1935).
78. State ex reL. Loseke v. Fricke, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N. W. 409 (1934).
79. Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (935).
So. Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N. Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (935).
8I. California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal. 298, 298 Pac. 485 (931);
California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (1933).
82. Board of Regents v. Sullivan, 42 P. (2d) 61g (Ariz. 1935).
83. State v. Regents of University System, 179 Ga. 210, 175 S. E. 567 (1934).
84. State ex rel. Miller v. State Bd.,of Educ., 52 P. (2d) 141 (Idaho, 1935).

85. Caldwell Bros. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 176 La. 825, 147 So. 5 (933) ; State ex reL.
Porterie v. Charity Hospital, 182 La. 268, 161 So. 6o6 (935) (buildings for state hospital).
86. Fanning v. University of Minn., 183 Minn. 222, 236 N. W. 217 (93).

87. For a collection of laws creating authorities, see Foley, Revenne Financing of Public
Enterprises (1936) 35 Mica. L. REv. i, 6.
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ards which can be applied in appraising the efficacy of any particular plan of
public financing, the housing authority offers the best solution to the problem
of furnishing adequate housing facilities to persons with low income. That
it is possible under the state constitutions for the legislatures to pass laws
creating or providing for the creation of housing authorities is beyond
question. Such authorities may be given powers as broad, in constructing,
financing and operating housing projects, as private corporations engaged
in a similar type of business customarily exercise. 81 The public has nothing
to fear from such broad powers being vested in public corporate entities
when such agencies are engaged in a non-profit-making endeavor, are managed by experts whose full time and energy are devoted to the business of
the corporation, and are constantly under public regulation and control.
Moreover, the fact that such authorities do not have the power to levy
taxes or to draw upon general public funds must commend this type of
instrumentality to those persons who are concerned with the spectre of
rising state and municipal taxes.
Although the use of the authority as a device for financing and undertaking public service enterprises has been a very recent development in the
field of municipal law, twenty states have adopted laws creating or providing
for the creation of authorities with power to undertake low-rent housing
programs.8 9 Most of these laws were prepared by the Public Works Administration at the request of the governors of the respective states. The
type of authority which was suggested was one created by or under state
legislation but not one which would be authorized to engage in a state-wide
housing program.9 0 On the contrary, the law suggested by PWA provided
for the creation of housing authorities in many municipal corporations.
Under the form of law suggested by PWA and enacted in many states,
each housing authority would be a body corporate and politic managed by
five commissioners appointed by the mayor to serve for staggered terms of
five years. The commissioners would receive no salary, but the expenses
incident to the exercise of their duties would be reimbursed. Each housing
authority would be empowered to plan, construct, reconstruct and operate
88. See supra note 57.
89. Ala. Gen. Acts 1935, no. 56, p. 126; Colo. Sess. Laws 1935, c. 132; Del. Laws 2d
Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 16; Ill. Laws 3d Spec. Sess. 1934, p. I59; Ky. Acts 1934, c. 113; La.
Acts 1936, no. 275, p. 697; Md. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 32; Mass. Acts 1933, c. 364,
amended by Mass. Acts 1935, c. 449; Mont. Laws 1935, c. i4o; Neb. Laws 1935, c. 29; N. J.
Laws 1933, c. 444; N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 4, amended by N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 3io; N. C. Pub.
Laws 1935, c. 456; Ohio Laws Ist Spec. Sess. 1933, § 1078, P. 56; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
Supp. 1935) tit. 53, § 2900 (not limited to housing) ; R. I. Acts Spec. Sess. x935, c. 2255; S.
C. Laws 1934, no. 783, p. 1368, amended by S. C. Laws 1935, nos. 301, 345, PP. 424, 502;
Tenn. Acts Spec. Sess. 1935, c. 20; W. Va. Acts 2d Ex. Sess. (933), c. 93; Wis. Laws 1935,
c. 525. Hawaii also has a housing authority act: Hawaii Laws 1935, c. 262A.

For a discussion of the Kentucky Act, see Pumphrey, Housing Legislation in Kentucky
(1936) 24 Ky. L. REv. 306, 47o.
9o. An act similar to Tenn. Acts Spec. Sess. 1935, c. 20, was suggested rather than an
act along the lines of N. J. Laws 1933, c. 444.
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housing projects, to take over projects by lease or purchase and to operate
projects so acquired, to act as agent in the acquisition, construction, operation or management of housing projects, to acquire necessary personal property and to acquire real property by eminent domain under procedure provided by existing state law, to engage in research relating to housing, to
convey real property to a governmental agency for use in connection with
a housing project, and to borrow money and to accept grants for housing
projects. The authority would have the power to finance a housing project
by the issuance of bonds secured by a mortgage on and a pledge of the
income from such project, but in no case would the authority be authorized
to issue a bond which would be an obligation of the state or the municipality
in which the authority operates.
Whether or not a revenue bond of a housing authority additionally
secured by a foreclosable mortgage would constitute a debt of a state or of
the municipal corporation in which the authority is operating notwithstanding provisions in the enabling act prohibiting the authority from creating
such a debt, has not been decided by any court. If the authority's bonds
are secured solely by a pledge of revenues, there is no question but that such
a debt would not be created in those states which adopt the special fund
doctrine.9 1 It is only the mortgage-sometimes considered as necessary if
private capital is to be attracted-which makes the legality of the bonds of a
housing authority an unsettled question.
A few courts have held that a foreclosable mortgage on state or
municipal property as additional security for a revenue bond will create a
debt within the meaning of a constitutional provision relating to municipal
or state indebtedness.9 2 These decisions, however, should not be controlling
as to bonds issued by a housing authority for the reason that the property
of such an authority is not property of the state or of any municipal corporation, but property of an entity separate and distinct from the state or
any municipal corporation. Moreover, so long as the mortgage covers property acquired by the authority with the proceeds of obligations which it
issues, no question of state or municipal debt should arise because the mortgage in such a case would be in the nature of a purchase money mortgage
which is generally considered as coming within the purview of the special
93
fund doctrine.
91. See supra note 49.
92. Santa Cruz v. Wykes, 202 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 9th, 913) ; Boykin v. River Junction,
121 Fla. 9o2, 164 So. 558 (1935) ; Brash v. State Tuberculosis Bd., 167 So. 827 (Fla. 1936) ;
Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 86i (1902) ; Browne v. Boston, i79 Mass. 321, 6o
N. E. 934 (igoi) ; Ironwood Waterworks Co. v. Trebilcock, 99 Mich. 454, 58 N. V. 371
(1894) ; Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912) ; In re Opinion to the
Governor, 54 R. I. 45, 169 AtI. 748, 89 A. L. R. 1521 (933) ; State v. Portage, 174 Wis. 588,
184 N. W. 376 (i92i).
93. Jerseyville v. Connett, 49 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 7th, i93i) ; Fox v. Bicknell, 193
Ind. 537, 141 N. E. 222 (i923) ; Hughes v. State Bd. of Health, 26o Ky. 228, 84 S. W. (2d)
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In fact, it can be argued that even if the mortgage covers property
which has been donated to the housing authority by the state or a municipal
corporation, or is purchased with moneys turned over to the authority by a
state or a municipal corporation, the principle that no state debt is created
should apply, because once the property or the money comes into the hands
of the authority, for example, from an appropriation by the state, it ceases
to be state or municipal property and thereafter should be subject to the
same liability as any other property acquired by the authority. 9 4 Nor
should the use of state funds in aid of a housing authority be construed as
a lending of the state's credit in violation of a constitutional provision prohibiting the lending of credit to a person, association or corporation. 5
The argument that when a housing authority mortgages its property
to secure its bonds the bonds become debts of the state or of a municipal
corporation, must rest upon the theory that the property is state or municipal
property and that the risk of the forfeiture of this property may result in
the levy of a tax to save it from foreclosure at the hands of bondholders.
This argument is fallacious. It overlooks the fundamental facts that the
housing authority is an entity separate and distinct from the state or any
municipal corporation and that the legislature has delegated to the housing
authority full power to take title to property in its own name and to hold
such property for its own uses. Having plenary control over its property,
however acquired, the authority may convey fee simple title to such property. It would hardly be disputed that such a conveyance by the authority
would not be regarded as a conveyance by the state or any municipal corporation or as the conveyance of property owned by the state or a municipal
corporation. How, therefore, can it be said that a mortgage of a housing
authority, which is simply a conveyance subject to a condition subsequent,
is a mortgage by the state or by a municipal corporation on property of the
state or of any corporation other than the authority?
It would be an anomalous doctrine which would affirm that when the
state or a municipal corporation, acting under proper legislative authority,
creates an encumbrance upon its property which, like the property of the
(1935) ; State ex rel. Excelsior Springs v. Smith, 336 Mo. 11o4, 82 S. W. (2d) 37 (1935);
State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, ioo Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (1935) ; Farmers State Bank
v. Conrad, IOO Mont. 415, 47 P. (2d) 853 (1935) ; Kasch v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.
E. 813 (1922) ; Clarke v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 177 S. C. 427, z81 S. E. 481
(1935) ; Seward v. Bowers, 37 N. M. 385, 24 P. (2d) 253 (933) semble.
94. See California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (1933)
State Highway Comm. v. Veiling, 230 Ky. 381, 19 S. W. (2d) 967 (1929); State ex rel.
Porterie v. Charity Hospital, 182 La. 268, 161 So. 6o6 (935) ; State ex rel. Hannibal v.
Smith, 335 Mo. 825, 74 S. W. (2d) 367 (1934) ; State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 1oo Mont.
391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (1935). But see Wilson v. State Water Supply Comm., 84 N. J. Eq. 15o,
52

93 Atl. 732 (1915).

95. State ex rel. Porterie v. Charity Hospital, 182 La. 268, 161 So. 6o6 (935) ; State ex
tel. Normile v. Cooney, IOO Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (1935) ; Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis.
518, 22o N. W. 816 (1928). But see Brash v. State Tuberculosis Bd., 167 So. 827 (Fla.
1936) ; In re Opinion of the justices, 195 N. E. 897 (Mass. 1935).
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housing authority, is held for the benefit of the public, no debt is contracted
except that of the state or the municipal corporation itself, but that if a
housing authority creates an encumbrance on its property, a debt of the state
or some public corporation, in addition to the debt of the housing authority,
is contracted. No special grounds of public policy and no historical antecedents require or justify such a rule of law.
An authority, such as a housing authority, is not within the express
language of any constitutional provision limiting the creation of debts by
the state or its political subdivisions. Nor is a housing authority within
the intended scope of such constitutional provisions, which were framed to
apply only to state agencies having the power of taxation. In order to
avoid a default upon its bonds, the housing authority can impose no tax
burden upon any property owner.
The case law on the subject of authorities has been further developed
in Pennsylvania and New York than in any other states. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority,90 upheld the validity of a statute 97 creating an authority in each
county of the second class in the commonwealth. Pursuant to this statute,
the commissioners of Allegheny County obtained a certificate of incorporation for the Allegheny County Authority and the Authority proposed to
finance the construction and operation of a tunnel as part of the highway
system in the vicinity of the City of Pittsburgh. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, carefully limiting its decision to the project before it, decided that
the highways, roads, streets and bridges of the state were property of the
state, and the legislature could set up a public corporation as the agency of
the state to finance, administer, control and maintain them. The separate
corporate status of the authority was recognized to the extent that the court
said "it cannot be said that the Authority's debt will be the debt of the
county." The earlier decision in the case of Lesser v. Warren Borough 98
was cited with approval and distinguished on the ground that in that case
"the borough's bonds were to be secured, not alone by the revenue from
the waterworks proposed to be purchased, but by the waterworks itself."
Although the statute pursuant to which the Allegheny County Authority
was created authorized an authority to give a mortgage on the property as
security for its revenue bonds, this power was not exercised by the Allegheny
County Authority, and the court therefore did not pass upon the effect of a
mortgage given as additional security for the authority's bonds.
The most recent Pennsylvania case relating to authority legislation is
Kelley v. Earle,9 9 in which was involved a statute creating the General State
96. 316 Pa. 65, 173 AtI. 289

(1934).

97. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. i935) tit. 16, § 416o.

98. 237 Pa. Soi, 85 AtI. 839 (1912).

99. 320 Pa. 449, 182 Ati. 50, (1936).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Authority. 10 0 The project which was the subject of the litigation was a
waterworks, to be constructed by the General State Authority on land to be
donated to the authority by the commonwealth and to be leased to the commonwealth at a rental sufficient to pay operating expenses of the authority
and the principal of and interest on its bonds. The lease provided that
upon payment by the commonwealth of the stipulated rentals title to the
waterworks would vest in the commonwealth. The court held that the proposed lease would create a debt of the commonwealth prohibited by the constitution for the reason that it amounted to the purchase by the commonwealth of a capital improvement through annual instalments. The majority
opinion (there were three dissenting opinions) did not expressly state that
the Act creating the state authority was unconstitutional, and it can reasonably be construed as condemning, not the act creating the authority, but the
particular method employed by the authority for financing the project. 01
In approving the Tranter decision, the court reaffirmed the proposition that
revenue financing by public corporations is consistent with the constitution.
In New York, the Court of Appeals has held that the legislature may
create 102 or provide for the creation 103 of an authority where there is no
attempt to grant it general powers of local government but where the sole
purpose of the authority is to finance and undertake a useful revenue-producing enterprise.10 4 On the question of the constitutionality of bonds of
an authority, the court has held that obligations of the Buffalo Sewer Authority payable solely from the revenues of the sewer project under the
jurisdiction of the Authority did not constitute a debt of the City of
Buffalo. 10 5 Under both the New York and Pennsylvania decisions the
question is still open as to whether a debt within the meaning of the state
constitution would be created if bonds of an authority are additionally secured by a mortgage either upon property which is acquired by the authority
with the proceeds of its obligations or upon property of the authority conveyed to it by the state or a municipality.
In the Buffalo Sewer Authority case, the New York court mentioned
and apparently considered the fact that the bonds of the Authority were not
secured by a mortgage, for the court said:
"Bonds issued by the Sewer Authority are not protected by a lien upon
the lands or properties either of the existing sewer system or upon the
io. Pa. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1935) tit. 71, § 17o7.
101. From the language of the dissenting opinions and from the nature of the pleadings,
however, it is possible to justify the conclusion that the entire act was condemned.
102. Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 74o (1935) ; Gaynor v. Marohn,
268 N. Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (I935).
1O3. Suffolk County v. Water Power and Control Comm., 269 N. Y. 158, 199 N. E. 41
(1935).
lO4. See Foley, A Note on Recent Authority Cases (1936) I LEGAL NOTES ONTLocAL
GOVERNMENT 2.

105. Robertson v. Zimmernann, 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (i935).
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lands and properties to be acquired. The sewer rents provide the only
means of payment." 106

A favorable decision by the New York Court of Appeals or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on questions raised by the additional security of the
mortgage would go a long way toward establishing a legal basis for a
nation-wide movement for the creation of state authorities to finance, construct and operate housing projects for persons of low income.
CONCLUSION

There is a story told by Mr. Justice Holmes about a Vermont justice
of the peace, before whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another
farmer for breaking a churn. The justice of the peace took time to consider
the problem and then said he had looked through the statutes, could find
nothing about churns, and therefore gave judgment for the defendant. It
is to be hoped that the same state of mind will not be shown by justices who,
sooner or later, will be looking through the cases for something about
housing authorities.
The cases which will arise involving housing authorities will not be
solved by reference to any precedent in point, for there is none. There are
some analogies on one side and some analogies on the other side. In the
field of housing there is no established rule of law. If there are but a few
precedents specifically upholding the power of the state to deal with housing,
there are even fewer precedents which deny that power. Every effort to
extend the functions of the state is viewed with alarm and is branded as
socialistic by its opponents. But by others equally devoted to our institutions an extension of the social functions of the state into new fields is regarded as necessary to preserve those institutions. Certainly city slums are
not the safest frontiers against subversive ideas. But whatever the conflict
may be as to the wisdom of state action in the housing field, it is submitted
that this conflict presents a legislative rather than a judicial question. It is
not for judges to strike down legislation simply because it does not conform
with their own social or economic predilections.
In this article an attempt has been made to choose between the competing analogies of existing rules and to select that analogy which appears
to be thoroughly in harmony with the rest of the law of public financing and
wholly consonant with the social purpose of government. It is submitted
that the following general propositions are sound in principle:
(I) That the legislature has the power to create and provide for the
creation of new public corporations.
iO6. Id. at 62,
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N. E. at 744.
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(2) That the legislature has the power to authorize as the sole corporate purpose of such public corporations the construction of homes for
persons having an income insufficient to obtain the use of privately owned
.safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations.
(3) That the legislature has the power to declare that housing for
persons of low income is a public purpose for which land may be condemned
and for which public property may be donated.
(4) That although not vested with power to undertake a state-wide
housing program, a housing authority created by or under state laws and
limited in its activities to a local area, because it is concerned primarily with
health and public welfare, is a state instrumentality and not the agency of
the municipal corporation within whose territory it may function.
(5) That the obligations of such public corporations are not debts enforcible against the state or of any other of its agencies or instrumentalities,
or of its political or civil subdivisions, since such public corporations are
juristic persons, independent of their creators, and like other corporations
wear the cloak of limited liability.
(6) That the obligations of such public corporations do not constitute
debts within the meaning of a constitutional debt provision, since such obligations are not payable from revenues derived from taxation, nor are they
,a burden on the taxing power.
(7) That since such public corporations have the power to take title to
property in their own names, hold such property for their own uses, and
.alienate such property when alienation is desirable, the fact that the obligations of such public corporations are secured by liens upon their property,
as well as upon the revenues of their property, should not make such instruments debts of the state or of any corporation other than the expressed
obligor.
(8) That the creation of housing authorities of the character described
provides a constitutional method whereby a state may accomplish a desired
social result without interfering with or duplicating the functions of local
governmental units.

